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Abstract	
Considerable	 efforts	 by	 leading	 experts	 and	 funds	 from	 around	 the	 world	 are	 put	 into	
restructuring	 the	West	Bank	 justice	and	security	 sector	 (JSS).	This	 is	 an	effort	done	 in	a	
highly	contested	environment,	with	an	ongoing	Israeli	occupation	and	weak	local	trust	in	
the	Palestine	Authority	(PA).	This	article	analyzes	the	understandings	by	local	Palestinian	
non‐government	organizations	and	international	bodies	aiding	in	building	the	JSS	of	what	a	
legitimate	development	of	the	JSS	is	and	should	be,	and	whose	voices	become	dominant	in	
the	 discussions	 and	 implementations	 of	 it.	 The	 argument	 made	 is	 that	 Western	 legal	
knowledge,	with	its	focus	on	security	and	technocratic	solutions,	have	been	dominant	at	the	
expense	of	core	political	solutions	in	regard	to	the	Israeli	occupation	and	the	workings	of	
the	PA,	and	that	it	has	downplayed	the	local	context,	local	voices	and	their	understandings	
of	a	legitimate	JSS.		
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Introduction	
A	justice	and	security	sector	(JSS)1	is	being	reconstructed	in	the	West	Bank	with	the	assistance	of	
leading	 international	 experts	 and	 funds.	 This	 is	 happening	 within	 the	 context	 of	 an	 ongoing	
conflict	and	occupation,	with	Palestine	not	internationally	recognized	as	an	independent	state,	
and	where	the	Palestine	Authority	(PA)	controls	only	about	18	per	cent	of	the	West	Bank	area.	A	
recurring	 topic	 in	 research	 on	 peace‐	 and	 state‐building	 is	 the	 relationship	 between	 building	
states	and	building	peace,	and	the	possibilities	for	building	state	structures	such	as	a	JSS	in	war‐
torn	societies	experiencing	ongoing	conflict—what	should	come	first:	peace	or	a	state	(Call	2008).	
This	 is	 also	 a	 dilemma	 in	 the	West	 Bank,	 leading	 to	mistrust	 and	 disagreement	 on	 priorities	
between	the	international	and	local	levels.	This	article	investigates	how	mistrust,	priorities	and	
disagreements	 are	 verbalized	 by	 local	 Palestinian	 non‐government	 organizations	 (NGOs)	 and	
international	bodies	aiding	in	building	the	JSS,	with	the	aim	of	analyzing	local	and	international	
visions	of	the	West	Bank	JSS	in	a	postcolonial	legal	perspective.	What	is	understood	as	a	legitimate	
development	 of	 the	 JSS,	 and	 whose	 voices	 become	 dominant	 in	 the	 discussions	 and	 its	
implementation?	The	argument	made	is	that	the	doxa	of	Western	legal	knowledge,	with	its	focus	
on	security,	technical	advice	and	financial	assistance,	has	been	dominant	at	the	expense	of	core	
political	solutions	in	regard	to	the	Israeli	occupation	and	the	workings	of	the	PA,	and	that	this	has	
downplayed	local	voices,	justice	practices	and	understandings	of	a	legitimate	JSS.		
	
Before	discussing	the	various	views	on	the	development	of	the	JSS,	it	is	necessary	to	introduce	
the	methodology	and	the	immensely	complex	legal	landscape	of	the	West	Bank,	and	the	efforts	
which	have	been	taken	to	develop	the	JSS	and	to	situate	it	within	postcolonial	legal	theory.		
	
Epistemology	of	the	South		
This	study	is	based	on	two	interviews	with	representatives	of	United	States	(US)	and	European	
Union	(EU)	bodies	situated	in	the	West	Bank	with	mandates	to	assist	in	building	the	Palestinian	
JSS—the	United	States	Security	Coordinator	for	Israel	and	the	Palestinian	Authority	(USSC)	and	
the	EU	Coordinating	Office	for	Palestinian	Police	Support	(EUPOL	COPPS)—and	interviews	with	
six	local	Palestinian	NGOs,	all	of	which	were	conducted	between	February	and	May	2014.2	These	
NGOs	work	within	JSS‐affiliated	areas	of	interest:	women’s	rights,	the	rights	of	children,	prisoner	
rights,	 human	 rights,	 victims	 of	 torture	 and	 restorative	 justice	 and	 conflict	 mediation.	 The	
interviewees	spoke	with	me	as	organizational	representatives.	Still,	 it	 is	unavoidable	that	they	
also	represented	their	own	position,	and	that	an	interview	with	a	different	person	from	the	same	
organization	 might	 have	 produced	 different	 answers.	 The	 interviewed	 persons,	 nonetheless,	
stand	in	this	article	as	representatives	for	their	organizations,	and	are	referred	to	by	the	type	of	
organization	they	represent,	something	also	agreed	upon	during	the	interviews.	This	material	can	
neither	 represent	 the	whole	 complexity	 of	 international	 efforts	 in	 developing	 the	 Palestinian	
security	sector,	nor	the	totality	of	local	NGO	perspectives.	Its	diversity,	nevertheless,	represents	
a	sufficient	part	of	civil	society	to	meet	the	main	scope	of	this	article.		
	
The	analysis	focuses	on	the	discursive	practices	of	the	interviewees.	Conceptually,	the	analysis	
may	be	placed	within	postcolonial	legal	studies	and	Southern	Criminology	(cf.	Carrington,	Hogg	
and	Sozzo	2016),	a	Southern	socio‐legal	study	aiming	to	include	‘histories	and	patterns	of	crime,	
justice	and	security	outside	the	global	north’	(Carrington	and	Hogg	2017:	4)	and	its	interaction	
with	 the	 North,	 and	 to	 offer	 ‘challenges	 [to]	 the	 power	 imbalances	 which	 have	 privileged	
knowledge	produced	in	the	metropolitan	centres	of	the	Global	North’	(Carrington	and	Hogg	2017:	
4).	
	
Research	 involving	people	requires	special	care.	This	 is	especially	 important	when	the	people	
involved	are	on	the	weaker	side	of	power	relations	with	great	impact	on	their	lives,	such	as	is	the	
case	of	 the	Palestinians	 living	under	occupation	(AbdulMajeed	and	Sakka	2014).	Protection	of	
interviewee	identity	is	vital;	names,	gender	and	interviewed	members	of	NGOs	are	anonymized	
in	both	publication	and	data	storage	to	protect	participants	from	possible	negative	consequences	
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from	participation	in	this	study.	The	international	bodies	are	not	anonymized	due	to	their	official	
and	public	mission,	along	with	the	impossibility	of	doing	so	as	they	are	unique	in	their	positions.	
When	going	into	a	field	with	strong	power	relations,	additional	precautions	must	also	be	taken,	
and	have	been	in	this	work.	One	needs	to	understand	the	involved	persons	in	their	context	and	to	
respect	 their	 dignity.	 AbdulMajeed	 and	 Sakka	 (2014)	 warn	 against	 research	 in	 Palestine	 not	
taking	the	context	of	structural	restraints	into	account	and	being	driven	by	theoretical	concepts	
ill‐fitted	 for	 understanding	 the	 context	 of	 occupation.	 The	 standard	 ethical	 guidelines	 of	 the	
Swedish	 Research	 Council’s	 Expert	 Group	 on	 Ethics	 (2011)	 concerning	 research	with	 human	
subjects	are	also	followed.		
	
The	complex	legal	landscape	of	the	West	Bank	
Being	under	foreign	rule	for	the	past	500	years,	Palestine	has	never	had	full	authority	of	laws,	a	
given	territory	or	physical	force.	Each	foreign	power	has	implemented	its	own	legislation.	The	
Ottoman	period	ending	in	1917	implemented	Ottoman	laws.	When	the	British	Mandate	then	took	
control	of	the	area,	British	Mandate	laws	were	implemented.	In	1948,	the	West	Bank	was	annexed	
by	Jordan,	and	Gaza	by	Egypt,	which	implemented	their	own	laws.	In	1967,	Israel	occupied	the	
West	Bank	and	executed	Israeli	military	orders	(Khalidi	et	al.	2006).3		
	
The	 Jordanian	Penal	Law	of	1960	 is	now	the	most	used	 in	West	Bank	criminal	cases	but	 laws	
stemming	 from	 all	 the	 above	 foreign	 powers	 are	 still	 used	 as	 necessary	 supplements.4	 This	
includes	Israeli	military	orders	which	are	mostly	used	to	fill	gaps	in	other	laws	(Milhem	and	Salem	
2011).	Palestinian	laws	are	in	the	making,	such	as	the	yet‐to‐be‐implemented	draft	version	of	the	
Palestinian	Penal	Code,	and	an	implemented	national	penal	procedural	law	in	use	since	2001.		
	
In	addition	to	plurality	of	laws,	there	is	also	plurality	of	jurisdictions.	Different	jurisdictions	apply	
depending	on	geographical	area	and	formal	 identity.	There	 is	one	 jurisdiction	 for	Palestinians	
with	a	West	Bank	ID,	who	can	be	sentenced	in	Palestinian	courts.	There	is	one	jurisdiction	for	
Palestinian	Jerusalemites,	and	one	for	Palestinian	Israelis	who	are	subject	to	the	authority	of	the	
Israeli	civilian	judiciary.	Israeli	citizens	living	in	colonies	in	the	West	Bank	also	belong	to	Israeli	
civilian	courts.	Palestinian	police	have	no	authority	over	this	population.		
	
Geographical	jurisdiction	was	divided	in	the	Oslo	II	agreement	of	1995,	where	the	West	Bank	was	
split	into	A‐,	B‐	and	C‐areas,	reflecting	the	three	different	administrative	responsibilities	for	the	
region.	The	PA	was	assigned	civilian	and	security	control	over	the	A‐areas.	Israel	and	the	PA	were	
to	cooperate	on	governing	B‐areas,	which	are	now	under	control	of	the	Israeli	military.	C‐areas	
were	to	be	under	full	Israeli	control.	The	A‐areas	consist	of	approximately	18	per	cent	of	the	West	
Bank,	and	the	B‐areas	of	about	21	per	cent,	leaving	the	C‐areas	at	61	per	cent	of	the	West	Bank	
(Bouris	2014).		
	
The	Palestinians	have	created	local	legal	avenues	such	as	Sulha	when	no	satisfactory	official	legal	
system	was	offered.	Customary	law	is	a	vital	part	of	the	legal	culture	and	practice	in	Palestine,	
and	is	at	least	as	widespread	as	formal	law	in	both	prevalence	and	types	of	cases	(Fares,	Milhem	
and	Khalidi	2006;	Kelly	2005;	Khalidi	et	al.	2006;	Milhem	and	Salem	2011).	This	represents	the	
main	 form	 of	 dispute	 resolution	 outside	 the	 state	 legal	 system,	 where	 the	main	 goals	 are	 to	
‘reconcile	 the	 conflicting	parties	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 customs	 and	 traditions	of	 the	 society’	 and	 to	
prevent	 social	 chaos	 and	 retaliations,	 where	 community	 is	 prioritized	 over	 individuals	 and	
settlement	of	conflicts	over	rule	of	law	(Fares,	Milhem	and	Khalidi	2006:	21;	Khalil	2010).	The	
customary	law	consists	of	different	forms	of	reconciliation	procedures	based	not	only	on	customs	
and	traditions,	common	sense,	religious	law	and	tribal	law	but	also	on	state	law	such	as	tribal	
adjudication	 or	 reconciliation	 committees,	 or	 even	 those	 conducted	 by	 legal	 departments	 of	
governorates5	 and	 security	 forces	 (Fares,	 Milhem	 and	 Khalidi	 2006;	 Kelly	 2006).	 Oft‐noted	
positive	sides	of	Sulha	include	possible	fast	results,	restoration	of	community	peace	and	ease	of	
use.	Negative	factors	include	outcomes	often	relying	on	power	relations	between	participants,	its	
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procedural	 lack	 of	 female	 involvement,	 and	 a	 possible	 heavy	 economic	 burden	 (Khalidi	 et	 al.	
2006).	The	important	point	in	this	context	is	that	a	locally	based	functioning	justice	system	exists	
in	Palestine,	with	its	flaws	and	strengths.	Furthermore,	this	system	is	vitally	important	due	to	lack	
of	access	to	places	and	persons	in	Palestine	for	the	Palestinian	judiciary	and	police.	Customary	
law	is	most	widespread	in	areas	where	the	PA	does	not	have	access	(Khalidi	et	al.	2006).	
	
Developing	the	West	Bank	justice	and	security	sector		
In	all	peace	agreements	and	talks	between	Palestine	and	Israel,	security	has	been	critical	to	the	
international	community,	only	intensifying	during	and	after	the	second	intifada	(Friedrich	and	
Luethold	2007).6	Security	coordination	between	Palestine	and	Israel	is	a	key	feature	of	this	and	
of	 the	PA	security	doctrine,	 and	 is	 further	 ‘a	major	 source	of	 tension	between	 the	Palestinian	
people	and	their	leadership’	(Tartir	2017:	15).	The	Roadmap	for	Peace,	an	agreement	signed	in	
2003	by	Israel,	the	PA	and	the	quartet	(US,	EU,	Russia,	United	Nations)	setting	out	a	strategy	for	
a	two‐state	solution,	is	the	main	agreement	regarding	contemporary	security	sector	reform	(SSR)	
efforts.7	SSR	is	seen	by	donor	states	as	central	to	the	peace	process.	
	
Some	core	obstacles	 to	Palestinian	SSR	are	argued	 to	be	 that	externally‐led	processes	are	not	
being	sensitive	to	local	needs	and	demands,	and	that	international	bodies	are	treating	Palestine	
as	a	country	without	recognizing	it	as	such	(Bouris	and	Reigeluth	2012).	What	a	JSS	is	to	be	in	
Palestine	is	largely	defined	by	external	actors,	where	security	concerns	are	dominant.	Friedrich	
and	Luethold	(2007:	14),	analyzing	how	SSR	in	Palestine	carries	different	meanings	to	different	
actors,	point	out	that:		
	
For	 a	majority	 of	 Palestinians,	 SSR	 is	 about	 the	 development	 of	 a	 fully‐fledged	
functional	 security	 sector,	 which	 protects	 them	 against	 Israeli	 incursions	 and	
provides	 the	 basis	 for	 statehood	 and	 sovereignty.	 Israel,	 in	 turn,	 looks	 at	
Palestinian	 SSR	 as	 a	means	 for	 enhancing	 her	 own	 security;	 accordingly,	 Israel	
expects	SSR	to	produce	a	system	of	Palestinian	policing,	too	weak	to	constitute	a	
danger	and	strong	enough	to	confront	the	‘infrastructure	of	terror’.	The	US,	several	
European	and	some	Arab	states,	very	much	in	line	with	Israel,	see	SSR	essentially	
as	a	process	to	revive	the	system	of	policing	laid	out	in	the	Oslo	Agreements	…	What	
has	been	missing	most	so	far	is	a	genuinely	Palestinian	perspective	on	the	current	
SSR	process	and	its	direction,	achievements	and	challenges.8	
	
A	division	between	assistance	to	security	and	civilian	control	has	been	created,	with	American‐
led	aid	to	security	and	EU‐led	aid	to	civilian	control	(Hussein	2007:	54).	The	USSC	was	established	
in	 2005	 to	 support,	 professionalize	 and	 consolidate	 the	 Palestinian	 security	 forces,	 meet	 US	
commitments	under	 the	Roadmap	and	assist	 the	PA	 to	meet	 its	 security	obligation	under	 the	
Roadmap	(Zanotti	2010).	All	SSR	assistance	from	the	US	is	channeled	through	the	USSC,	which	
also	coordinates	the	international	security	effort	(Philpott	2015).		
	
The	EUPOL	COPPS,	established	in	2006	as	a	civilian	mission	upon	request	from	the	PA	(Bouris	
2014;	Bulut	2009),9	was	also	formed	to	assist	in	the	Roadmap	implementation	and	to	coordinate	
donor	assistance	to	the	civilian	police	and	the	rule	of	law	(Bouris	2014).	It	consists	of	a	police	
advisory	section10	and	a	rule	of	law	section	(Bouris	2014)11,	with	the	latter	staffed	with	police	
officers,	magistrates	and	experts	from	EU	Member	States,	Canada,	Turkey	and	Norway.	EUPOL	
COPPS	works	for	‘civilian	police	primacy’,	implying	that	the	civil	police	should	be	the	main	law	
enforcement	agency	in	Palestine	(EUPOL	COPPS	2015).		
	
That	the	USSC	budget	is	manifoldly	higher	than	that	of	EUPOL	COPPS,	which	struggles	to	provide	
basic	funding	for	their	projects,	has	led	to	American	dominance	of	SSR	initiatives	(Bouris	2014:	
113).	The	international	bodies	are	fully	aware	of,	and	navigate	within,	this.	The	interviewed	USSC	
representative	provides	an	example	of	this:		
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So	for	instance,	the	[Palestinian]	police	came	to	me	and	said,	‘we	are	really	short	of	
riot	equipment	for	the	special	police	forces	…	can	you	replace	our	equipment’?	It	
is	expensive,	a	million	and	a	half	dollars.	And	I	said	‘have	you	asked	the	Europeans’,	
‘yes	we	have	asked	the	Europeans,	they	can’t	afford	to	do	it’.	So	I	said,	‘well	we’ll	
look	at	it’.	So	I	went	and	saw	my	boss	and	I	said	‘can	we	get	this’,	and	he	said	‘yes	
we	can	do	 this,	 strategically	 it's	a	good	move	because	 it	keeps	 the	police	 in	 the	
forefront’.	 He	 said,	 ‘but	what	 do	 the	 Europeans	 say’.	 I	 said,	 ‘the	 police	 said	 the	
Europeans	are	ok	with	it,	so	we	are	going	to	ask	the	Europeans	themselves’.	So	I	
went	to	head	of	EUPOL	COPPS	and	I	said	‘have	you	got	any	donors	out	there	who	
would	be	prepared	to	get	a	million	and	a	half	dollars	into	the	special	police	force,	
any	one	of	the	28	member	states	or	the	three	contributing	states’.	He	said	‘we’ll	ask	
them’,	so	he	asked	all	31,	but	no	one	said	yes.	Once	the	31	has	said	no,	then	under	
the	European	mandate,	the	mission	the	EUPOL	COPPS	has,	they	are	allowed	to	look	
outside,	which	is	us.	So	they	decided	to	do	it.	And	that	is	how	we	are	trying	to	do	
business.	We	say	to	the	Europeans,	‘they	want	this,	is	it	a	priority,	yes,	ok,	can	you	
afford	it,	no,	you	want	us	to	do	it,	yes,	ok’.	And	that's	the	way	we	do	business	(USSC).		
	
The	development	of	 the	 JSS	 can,	 in	 general,	 be	 said	 to	have	 focused	on	 curbing	 inner	 threats	
against	Israeli	security	along	with	a	technocratic	reformation	of	the	police	and	the	judiciary,	to	
the	 detriment	 of	 considering	 the	 security	 threats	 the	 Israeli	 occupation	 is	 posing	 to	 the	
Palestinian	population	and	the	traditional	justice	institutions	operating	in	Palestine.		
	
A	(post‐)colonial	legal	field		
Palestine	 finds	 itself	 in	 a	 peculiar	 situation	 between	 imperialism,	 colonization	 and	
postcolonialism.	Shihade	(2011)	refers	to	it	as	double	colonization;	Palestine	was	colonized	by	
Britain	in	1917,	then	by	Israel	in	1948.	Seen	differently,	colonization	ended	and	a	postcolonial	era	
started	 when	 Israel	 declared	 its	 independence.	 The	 independence	 of	 Israel	 simultaneously	
indicated	a	post‐British‐colonial	situation	while	the	conquered	Palestinian	population	remained	
in	a	colonial	situation	under	Israel	(Massad	2000).	This	complex	form	of	colonialism	has	also	been	
described	as	neo‐colonial,	signifying	that	colonialism	is	not	something	belonging	to	the	past,	while	
taking	into	account	the	economic,	cultural	and	political	implication	of	the	colonial	past	(Shohat	
1992:	104).	
	
In	 settler‐colonies,	 laws	are	 commonly	 transported	 from	colonizer	homelands	 to	 the	annexed	
territories,	 while	 preexisting	 law	 is	 ignored	 (Roy	 2008).	 Also	 in	 this	 context,	 a	 peculiar	 and	
complex	 (post‐)colony	has	evolved,	 as	 Israel	has	 established	one	 law,	 Israeli	 civil	 law,	 for	 the	
Israeli	 settlers	 in	 West	 Bank	 colonies,	 while	 Palestinians	 in	 the	 West	 Bank	 are	 subject	 to	 a	
different	 set	 of	 laws,	 Israeli	 military	 law.	 Existing	 laws	 have	 indeed	 been	 ignored	 but	 the	
indigenous	population	has	not	been	subjected	to	the	general	law	of	the	colonizers.	Roy	(2008)	
notes	that	when	European	colonizers	implemented	their	own	laws,	with	European	values,	 ‘the	
inherent	superiority	of	these	laws	were	(are)	subsequently	juxtaposed	against	the	irrational	and	
“barbaric”	laws	of	the	Other’	(Roy	2008:	330).	In	the	Palestinian	setting,	the	colonizer’s	laws	are	
not	for	the	indigenous	population;	their	Otherness,	however,	is	exaggerated	by	implementing	a	
particular	set	of	laws.	In	Palestine,	this	is	the	construction	of	the	Palestinian	dangerous	‘Other’,	
an	enemy	combatant,	to	be	ruled	by	military	law.		
	
The	concept	of	the	‘Other’,	introduced	by	Said	(1978)	as	part	of	colonial	powers’	production	of	
knowledge,	describes	the	categorization	and	production	of	images	of	the	non‐European	subject	
in	 relation	 to	Western	 civilization	 (Roy	 2008:	 321),	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 imperialism	 and	
metropolitanism.	These	are	images	of	‘“civilized”,	“progressive”	and	“lawful”	Europeans	against	
“barbaric”,	“static”	and	“lawless”	native	populations’	(Darian‐Smith	2013:	253).	Characterizing	
the	colonial	subject	as	the	‘Other’	has	the	effect	of	‘asserting	the	naturalness	and	primacy	of	the	
colonizing	culture	and	world	view’	 (Darian‐Smith	2013:	253).	 Social	 scientists	have	produced	
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such	theories	and	assumptions	of	universal	relevance,	although	based	on	Northern	metropolitan	
experiences	(Aas	2012).	Central	assumptions	within	the	JSS	field	include	the	concept	of	justice	as	
a	domestic	project	based	on	stable	nation	state	 systems	with	a	high	degree	of	 internal	peace,	
followed	by	an	ignorance	of	state	violence,	colonialism,	armed	struggles	and	customary	and	local	
forms	of	law,	justice	and	conflict	resolution	(Carrington,	Hogg	and	Sozzo	2016).	In	metropolitan	
thinking,	it	is	assumed	that	the	rest	of	the	world	will	follow	the	North’s	development	pattern;	the	
‘Others’	will	become	like	‘us’	if	helped	a	bit	on	the	way:	‘the	global	North	designates	the	normative	
benchmark	(the	development	destination)	to	which	the	rest	of	the	world	will	naturally	aspire’	
(Carrington,	Hogg	and	Sozzo	2016:	5).	In	knowledge	about	crime	and	justice,	Carrington	and	Hogg	
(2017)	refer	to	three	‘origin	stories’	of	criminology,	emanating	from	the	Anglo‐American	world,	
stories	 which	 have	 set	 the	 foundation	 of,	 and	 normalized	 and	 universalized	 our	 beliefs	 and	
knowledge	about,	crime	and	justice.	These	are	the	stories	of	the	individual	criminal	difference	
(the	 idea	 of	 the	 criminal	 as	 an	 atavist	 other),	 the	 modernization	 thesis	 (crime	 as	 an	 urban	
phenomenon),	and	classicism	(the	Hobbesian	idea	of	exchanging	your	right	to	use	violence	for	
the	protection	from	a	strong	state	with	monopoly	of	violence).	As	will	be	explored	below,	these	
assumptions	are	characteristic	for	international	bodies’	JSS	efforts	in	the	West	Bank,	and	these	
same	assumptions	are	contested	by	the	local	NGOs.		
	
Creating	the	‘Other’	
What	became	clear	during	the	interviews	with	the	international	bodies	and	from	their	mandates	
is	their	subtle	message	that	the	Palestinians	do	not	know	how	justice	and	security	is	done	and	are	
in	need	of	outside	expert	help.	In	order	to	achieve	a	well‐functioning	justice	system,	Palestinians	
must	be	trained	and	learn	what	a	modern	rational	justice	system	looks	like	and	how	it	is	operated,	
assuming	that	they	will	naturally	aspire	to	follow	the	North’s	development	patterns,	if	helped	on	
the	way	(cf.	Carrington,	Hogg	and	Sozzo	2016).	Workshops	and	training	of	security	and	judicial	
personnel	 comprise	 one	 avenue	 to	 achieve	 the	 desired	 system.	 The	 international	 bodies	 see	
themselves	as	providers	of	the	expertise	that	can	help	prevent	the	Palestinian	society	erupting	
into	chaos,	and	doing	this	provisioning	based	on	local	needs	and	opinions.	At	the	same	time,	this	
creates	an	image	of	the	Palestinian	as	‘Other’,	incapable	of	administering	justice	and	creating	a	
peaceful	society	on	her	own.	By	doing	this,	the	international	bodies	also	create	the	converse	image	
of	themselves	as	the	keepers	of	knowledge	about	a	rational	justice	and	security	system.		
	
The	 international	 bodies	 do	 not	 see	 any	 other	 option	 than	 to	 intervene	 in	 order	 to	 help	 the	
Palestinians	build	a	justice	system	if	they	are	to	prevent	chaos	here	and	now:	‘if	the	Palestinian	
Authority	wouldn't	provide	security	to	their	own	people	within	in	the	A‐areas	in	particular,	the	
law	of	the	gun	would	come	back’	(USSC).	They	do	see	constrictions	on	a	well‐functioning	justice	
system.	 The	 occupation	 is	 one	 such	 constriction;	 underdevelopment	 of	 the	 Palestinian	 legal	
culture	is	seen	as	another.	However,	as	anticipated	by	the	USSC,	the	Palestinian	National	Security	
Forces	(NSF)	have	the	possibility	of	overcoming	what	they	call	a	partly	backward	culture:	
	
[The	NSF]	perform	extremely	well.	They	don't	do	everything	as	I	would	do	it	or	as	
you	would	do	it,	but	the	thing	is	we	don't	live	at	home.	First	of	all	they	are	an	Arab	
society,	technically	a	third	world	society,	and	they	are	an	occupied	society,	so	they	
have	pressures	and	cultural	effects	upon	them	that	you	and	I	don't	have	(USSC).		
	
The	USSC	gains	legitimacy	by	respecting	things	being	done	differently	in	Palestine	than	in	their	
home	countries	and	by	acknowledging	 that	Palestinians	experienced	pressures	 from	both	 the	
occupation	and	cultural	norms.	While	showing	respect,	this	idea	of	difference	as	a	reason	why	
help	 is	needed	 from	the	outside	simultaneously	contributes	to	strengthening	 the	 image	of	 the	
‘Other’—peoples	 incapable	of	 determining	 future	directions	on	 their	own—and	devaluing	 the	
‘Other’s’	norms	and	culture.		
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The	Palestinian	‘Other’	is	also	a	terrorist	‘Other’.	A	conception	among	the	international	bodies	is	
that	their	assistance	helps	confine	the	manifestation	of	the	Palestinian	terrorist.	The	USSC	sees	it	
in	the	best	interest	of	the	US	to	strengthen	the	security	sector,	because	a	week	security	sector	can	
foster	terrorism.	Their	aim	is	to	have	a	stable	Fatah	government	that	can	keep	at	bay	Hamas	and	
other	 organizations	 labeled	 as	 terrorists:	 ‘Serious	 concern	 that	 Hamas	 would	 snatch	 power,	
overthrow	Fatah	and	that	things	would	dissolve	into	chaos.	There	were	serious	concerns.	People	
don't	say	it	in	quite	those	words,	no,	but	that's	the	reality	there.	And	the	Americans	in	particular	
were	concerned’	(USSC).		
	
As	with	the	USSC,	the	EUPOL	COPPS	sees	‘the	law	of	the	gun’	and	eruption	into	chaos	as	a	threat:	
‘Without	any	justice	institutions	there	is	mayhem,	and	there	is	no	recourse	at	all.	So,	it	is	a	priority,	
at	 the	moment,	 to	 give	 the	 Palestinian	 people	 some	 kind	 of	 recourse	 in	 these	 areas’	 (EUPOL	
COPPS).	They	send	a	message	about	the	unruly	Palestinian	incapable	of	peace	and	justice,	who	
risks	regressing	into	chaos	if	not	kept	within	a	structured	framework.		
	
These	attitudes	follow	patterns	discussed	above.	The	idea	of	providing	security	to	the	population	
within	the	A‐areas	(the	urban	areas	in	the	West	Bank)	to	avoid	mayhem	follows	the	origin	story	
of	crime	as	an	urban	phenomenon	(cf.	Carrington	and	Hogg	2017),	while	the	notion	of	no	recourse	
at	 all	 without	 proper	 justice	 institutions	 follows	 the	 Hobbesian	 origin	 story	 of	 exchanging	
individual	violence	for	a	strong	state	with	monopoly	on	violence.	The	idea	of	the	barbaric	lawless	
native	population	(cf.	Darian‐Smith	2013)	is	obvious	in	such	statements,	as	is	the	ignorance	about	
already	existing	functioning	conflict	resolution	systems	(cf.	Carrington,	Hogg	and	Sozzo	2016)	in	
the	West	Bank.		
	
One	could	claim	that	 ‘the	 law	of	 the	gun’	 is	not	a	risk	 for	a	 failed	 future	but,	 rather,	a	present	
ominous	force	in	the	West	Bank,	as	a	result	of	the	occupation	and	with	Israeli	military	law	having	
total	authority	over	the	West	Bank.	This	law	of	the	gun	is	mirrored	onto	the	Palestinian	‘Other’	as	
a	risk	factor	if	the	justice	systems	are	not	properly	built	with	external	assistance.	As	such,	this	is	
also	 an	 ignorance	 of	 armed	 struggles	 (cf.	 Carrington,	 Hogg	 and	 Sozzo	 2016)	 taking	 place	 in	
Palestine,	 both	 the	 Israeli	 armed	 occupation	 and	 the	 armed	 resistance	 against	 it,	 which	 is	
deciphered	into	security	on	one	side	and	terrorism	on	the	other.		
	
Non‐political	politics	
‘The	law	of	the	gun’	created	by	occupation	is	something	the	international	bodies	do	not	relate	to	
in	their	work.	The	EUPOL	COPPS	are	working	with	practical	matters:	how	to	make	something	
work—and	make	it	work	better—within	the	limits	set	by	politics.	They	clearly	state	that	they	do	
not	have	a	political	mandate	and	have	no	relations	to	or	communication	with	Israel.	Even	if	they	
see	the	occupation	as	obstructing	their	work,	there	is	nothing	they	can	do	about	it	and	they	are	
not	in	a	position	to	address	it.	They	have	a	purely	depoliticized	technocratic	mandate.	Unlike	the	
EUPOL	COPPS,	the	USSC	cooperates	extensively	with	Israel,	and	the	security	of	Israel	is	both	a	
priority	in	their	work	and	also	part	of	their	mandate:		
	
As	part	of	the	USSC	mandate,	one	of	the	things	we	never	do	is,	we	never	do	anything	
which	could	harm	the	security	of	the	state	of	Israel.	That	is	an	absolute	given.	That	
is	American	policy.	So	everything	we	do	is	with	the	understanding	of	the	state	of	
Israel,	and	the	knowledge	of	the	state	of	Israel	(USSC).	
	
The	USSC	experiences	criticism	from	some	NGOs	about	the	security	forces	because	they	are	seen	
as	cooperating	with	Israel.	The	USSC	responds	to	this	criticism	by	saying	that	these	NGOs	do	not	
understand	 that	 the	NSF	 is	 really	 there	 to	 protect	 the	Palestinians,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 at	 the	 cost	 of	
cooperating	with	Israel.		
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The	EUPOL	COPPS	fully	understands	the	frustration	of	the	NGOs	but,	when	criticized	by	NGOS	for	
not	addressing	problems	with	the	occupation,	they	think	the	NGOs	are	missing	the	point,	as	they	
are	not	able	to	go	outside	their	mandate:	
	
That	is	not	our	mandate,	as	frustrating	it	is	for	people	on	the	ground	when	they	see	
the	realities,	we	have	no	voice	to	discuss	the	political	situation	or	the	occupation,	
we	highlight	it	as	a	problem	for	access	to	justice,	but	we	are	mandated	to	deal	with	
what,	you	know,	reality	on	the	ground	...	we	don't	have	a	mandate	to	work	with	the	
Israeli	side	(EUPOL	COPPS).		
	
The	EUPOL	COPPS	are	unable	to	be	involved	in	any	sort	of	politics.	Even	though	the	occupation	is	
impacting	their	work,	they	have	to	try	to	pretend	it	is	not	there:	‘The	occupation	is	a	shadow	over	
everything.	As	much	as	we	prepare	 to	 try	 to	 ignore	 it,	 it	 is	 the	elephant	 in	 the	 room’	 (EUPOL	
COPPS).		
	
Studies	show	that	trying	to	build	state	structures	with	a	non‐political	mandate	is	unlikely	to	bear	
fruits:	‘statebuilding	is	not	simply	a	technocratic	exercise	in	capacity	building,	but	rather	one	that	
is	profoundly	embedded	in	difficult,	controversial	politics’	(Brynen	2008:	218).	The	international	
bodies	depoliticize	contentious	issues	into	questions	of	technicalities	and,	hence,	neutralize	their	
own	highly	political	involvement	in	a	highly	political	field,	the	JSS.	The	postcolonial	nature	of	this	
effort—apparent	in	the	rebuilding	the	justice	sector	as	a	domestic	project,	where	an	existing	state	
is	 taken	 for	 granted	 even	 though	 this	 state	 is	 non‐existent;	 in	 its	 ignorance	 of	 state	 violence,	
colonization	and	ongoing	armed	struggles;	and	in	its	universalized	ideas	about	what	a	JSS	is	and	
how	it	should	operate	 (cf.	Carrington,	Hogg	and	Sozzo	2016)—is	 thereby	neutralized	as	mere	
technical	assistance	or	as	a	general	question	of	security.		
	
Who	are	the	experts?	
The	NGOs	have	a	clear	political	address	for	their	problems:	the	occupation.	One	cannot	expect	the	
JSS	to	work	properly	before	an	end	to	the	occupation.	Thus,	the	international	bodies’	efforts	to	
improve	the	JSS	by	training	Palestinians	are	aiming	at	the	wrong	target.	Local	NGOs	are	frustrated	
about	where	efforts	are	directed.	They	are	 treated	as	the	problem	in	need	of	 training—as	the	
perpetrator,	the	unruly,	dangerous	or	terrorist	‘Other’—while	experiencing	themselves	as	victims	
of	a	brutal	occupation:	 ‘They	already	know	that	we	are	not	the	abusers	of	human	rights	to	be	
taught	human	rights	principles.	We	are	the	victims	of	human	rights	abuse’	(anti‐torture	NGO).	
This	is	echoed	in	scholarly	criticism	of	Northern	dominant	knowledge	production,	calling	for	a	
closer	 look	 at	 geopolitical	 context	 and	 the	 situatedness	of	knowledge:	 ‘Who	and	where	 is	 the	
“subject	at	risk”	and	who	and	where	is	the	“risky	subject”?’	(Aas	2012:	12).		
	
This	seems	to	be	contested	in	the	restructuring	of	the	JSS,	with	Palestinians	constructed	as	the	
risky	 subject.	According	 to	 the	NGOs,	 they	do	not	 have	a	problem	 requiring	 training;	 it	 is	 the	
Israelis	that	have	to	change:	 ‘maybe	we	should	do	more	workshops	for	the	occupation,	maybe	
they	can	stop	 this	behavior,	 and	maybe	we	can	 train	 them’	 (prisoner	NGO).	The	 international	
bodies	should	work	on	changing	Israeli	conduct,	where	the	main	problem	is	situated,	rather	than	
the	Palestinian:	‘The	Palestinians	are	too	weak	to	force	anything	on	the	Israelis.	So	our	hope	is	
that	the	international	community,	the	Europeans	or	the	Americans	can	practice	some	pressure	
on	the	Israelis	to	stop	torture’	(anti‐torture	NGO).	
	
While	 the	 international	bodies	highlight	 technical	police	and	military	competencies,	 the	NGOs	
emphasize	 local	knowledge.	Not	only	do	some	of	 the	NGOs	 think	 that	 the	 local	NGOs	are	best	
suited	to	conduct	training,	they	also	mistrust	the	intentions	of	international	bodies	believed	to	be	
‘only	following	their	own	agendas	and	are	out	of	touch	with	what	is	needed	on	the	ground,	or	they	
don’t	 care	because	 they	have	 their	own	agenda’	 (children’s	 rights	NGO).	Training	 is	 seen	as	 a	
hypocrisy	 that	 various	 parts	 of	 the	 security	 sector	 participate	 in	 only	 because	 it	 comes	with	
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money:	‘What	happens	with	us	here	is	that	a	lot	of	these	police	men	go	to	these	European	funded	
human	rights	 trainings	 just	because	 the	Europeans	give	 them	the	money’	 (human	rights	(HR)	
NGO).	The	human	rights	NGO	thinks	that	trainings	should	be	conducted	by	Palestinians	or	others	
more	credible	and	knowledgeable	of	the	local	context:	
	
…	most	of	the	works	of	the	trainers	I	have	seen	done	by	international	actors	have	
been	useless.	When	it	is	done	by	the	EU	and	so	forth	it	is	just	not	done	correctly.	
And	therefor	I	don’t	think	it	is	useful,	I	think	it	is	a	waste	of	funding.	But	that	done	
by	Palestinians	 is	different,	or	when	they	are	done	by	other	Arabs,	people	from	
other	Arab	countries	instead	(HR	NGO).	
	
From	the	position	of	 the	 international	bodies,	 the	security	sector	should	be	 trained	by	people	
experienced	within	 the	police	and	military	sectors;	Palestinian	civil	 society	 lacks	 the	required	
knowledge	to	conduct	this	job.	There	is	a	belief	that	NGO	competence	is	of	little	worth	when	it	
comes	to	training	employees	of	the	security	sector,	while	external	expertise	in	the	field	of	policing	
and	 security	 is	 valuable.	 In	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 USSC,	 only	 personnel	 with	 police	 or	 military	
experience	 should	 train	 the	 security	 forces,	 whereas	 the	 NGOs	 should	 work	 on	 other	 social	
problems:		
	
…	they	[NGOs]	are	not	the	right	people	to	do	it.	And	the	reason	that	they	are	not	
the	right	people	to	do	it	is	because,	not	because	they	are	not	good	in	dealing	with	
women	and	children	and	human	rights,	but	you	need	to	train	police	officers	and	
military	 with	 a	 police	 structured	 and	 organized	mentality.	 You	 have	 to	 have	 a	
policing	mentality	to	deliver	that	sort	of	training	and	that	sort	of	skill	set,	and	most	
of	the	people	in	the	NGOs	they	don't	have	that.	They	are	really	good	well‐meaning	
people,	but	they	can’t	relate	to	the	people	that	they	are	dealing	with.	And	so	their	
training	 immediately	 is	75%	 less	effective.	Before	 they	even	walk	 into	 the	door	
through	that	 training	room	their	 training	 is	75%	 ineffective,	because	 they	don't	
come	 from	 the	 right	 background	or	mindset	 or	mentality.	 But	 if	 you	 get	 police	
officers,	 or	 soldiers,	 or	 people	 with	 those	 background,	 even	 if	 they	 are	 not	
presently	a	soldier,	delivering	the	training	that	75%	isn’t	lost	when	you	walk	in	the	
door	(USSC).	
	
The	worth	of	NGO	competence	and	knowledge	is	minimized	to	that	of	well‐meaning	people	that	
can	deal	with	the	soft	tasks	of	women	and	children,	while	the	international	bodies	can	take	care	
of	the	hard	responsibilities	of	work	with	police	and	military.		
	
The	international	bodies	are	firm	when	asserting	that	they	are	not	imposing	anything	on	their	
Palestinian	 counterparts	 or	 society.	 Still,	 what	 they	 offer	 in	 cooperation	 is	 Western	 legal	
knowledge,	experience,	expertise	and	doxa.	Even	if	there	might	be	good	intentions	and	emphasis	
on	building	local	ownership	to	the	JSS,	their	assistance	comes	with	a	blindness	to	the	worth	of	
local	and	Arabic	expertise,	justice	structures	and	traditions	of	conflict‐resolution,	and	a	firm	belief	
in	 the	 universal	 relevance	 of	 Anglo‐American	 expertise	 and	 experience	within	 the	 police	 and	
military	sector.		
	
Security	vs	legitimacy	
In	order	for	a	legal	system	to	be	considered	just	by	its	population,	it	needs	to	be	experienced	as	
legitimate:	 ‘Law	has	to	be	a	human	law.	Law	has	to	be	 justice,	has	to	have	norms,	has	to	have	
morals,	has	to	have	values.	That’s	why	I	am	thinking,	people	who	are	working	in	law	has	to	be	
aware,	not	to	say	“oh,	this	is	legal”.	What	legal,	legal	according	to	what?’	(Restorative	Justice	NGO).	
Experienced	legitimacy	has	consequences	for	how	the	NGOs	see	the	laws,	how	they	are	enforced,	
and	 how	 the	 international	 bodies	 assist	 in	 building	 their	 structures.	 The	 justice	 sector	 is	 not	
considered	legitimate,	as	illustrated	by	this	NGO’s	account:		
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And	if	we	want	to	analyze	how	many	of	those	laws	came	in	place,	the	goal	behind	
those	laws	was	to	subjugate	the	Palestinian	people.	So	it	was	never	a	legal	system	
with	the	goal	of	ensuring	that	the	Palestinian	people	will	have	dignity,	will	have	
freedom	of	movement	or	freedom	of	opinion,	or	economic	rights.	The	whole	way	
the	structure	was	put	on	Palestinians	was	that	it	was	imposed	(HR	NGO).		
	
This	is	primarily	because	they	do	not	see	the	PA	and	its	institutions	as	legitimate	representatives	
of	 the	 Palestinian	 people,	 and	 because	 they	 experience	 security,	 particularly	 Israeli	 security,	
coming	before	 justice	for	Palestinians.	According	to	Tartir	(2017),	many	Palestinians	view	the	
security	coordination	with	Israel	as	a	national	betrayal,	something	that	immensely	impacts	the	
legitimacy	of	the	PA	and	its	security	forces.	A	2014	poll	showed	that	80	per	cent	of	West	Bank	
residents	oppose	security	coordination	with	Israel	(Tartir	2017:	16).	According	to	Brynen	(2008:	
228),	 this	 relationship	 between	 protection	 of	 Israeli	 security	 interests	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	
domestic	stability	and	trust	in	the	PA	on	the	other,	has	essentially	been	a	dilemma	since	the	Oslo	
Accords.	This	also	implies	a	balancing	act	for	operations	of	the	international	bodies.		
	
The	international	bodies	legitimize	their	work	through	their	close	cooperation	with	PA	officials,	
such	as	ministers	and	chiefs	of	police	and	security	forces.	Among	the	NGOs,	however,	trust	in	the	
PA	and	its	organizations	is	severely	weak.	They	are	of	the	opinion	that	the	PA	is	ruling	by	proxy	
for	Israel.	Going	back	to	Fanon	(1986),	this	is	a	recurring	topic	in	colonial	and	postcolonial	studies,	
where	 one	 observes	 local	 elites,	 who	 do	 not	 necessarily	 enjoy	 trust	 and	 legitimacy	 by	 the	
population,	 cooperate	 with	 and	 imitate	 colonial	 powers	 and	 international	 bodies	 (Roy	 2008;	
Spivak	1988).	
	
The	Palestinian	security	sector	depends	on	international	funding,	creating	strong	incentives	for	
the	PA	to	cooperate	with	international	bodies.	The	EUPOL	COPPS	is	of	the	opinion	that	they	avoid	
this	 problem	 by	 anchoring	 assistance	 in	 local	 reality	 and	 wishes	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 local	
ownership:		
	
…	it	takes	time	to	listening	to	them,	to	see	what	they	want.	Something	is	ridiculous.	
I	mean	we	just	can’t	accommodate,	you	know.	Other	things	are	very	legitimate.	And	
to	give	them	what	they	need,	and	at	the	same	time	provide	technical	advice	on	its	
practices.	 Certainly	 not	 pushing	 the	 European	 model	 at	 all.	 That	 is	 providing	
European	 expertise	 of	 the	European	member	 states	 to	 help	 them	achieve	what	
they	want.	But	obtaining	the	counterpart	its	ownership	is	vital.	I’ve	worked	with	
the	minister	 of	 justice	 for	 over	 two	 years	 now,	 and	we	meet	 the	minister	 very	
regularly.	That's	because	we	built	a	very	strong	trust	with	him.	And	he	knows	that	
we	provide	him	with	what	he	wants,	we	are	not	imposing.	It	just	doesn't	work.	One	
of	our	key	approaches	is	consider	and	ensuring	that	they	want	it	and	they	need	it.	
That	it	matches	for,	that	it	fits	the	situation	on	the	ground	rather	than	what	works	
in	Norway	or	other	countries	(EUPOL	COPPS).	
	
It	is,	however,	their	counterpart,	the	PA’s,	version	of	reality	and	wishes	that	causes	a	legitimacy	
problem	as	seen	from	the	perspective	of	local	NGOs:		
	
First	of	all,	the	ministry	of	justice	doesn’t	know	what	is	needed,	and	second	there	
is	 also	 a	 competition	 between	 the	 various	 ministries.	 There	 is	 a	 competition	
between	 the	 ministry	 of	 justice	 and	 the	 ministry	 of	 social	 affairs	 which	 is	
responsible	for	juvenile	justice.	And	also	many	of	them	are	incompetent	(children’s	
rights	NGO).	
	
The	NGOs	give	several	reasons	as	to	why	the	PA	and	the	security	forces	are	not	seen	as	legitimate:	
they	 are	 not	 perceived	 to	 be	 representing	 the	 Palestinian	 people;12	 they	 act	 in	 a	 repressive	
manner;	and	they	cooperate	with	Israel	on	security	issues.	This	is	something	that	reflects	on	the	
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legitimacy	of	the	international	bodies:	‘We	did	a	demonstration	in	front	of	the	European	police.	
We	closed	this	office	because	we	believe	that	they	cooperate,	they	are	involved	in	the	violence	
used	by	the	PA,	by	the	police	and	by	the	others’	(Prisoner	NGO).	Some	think	that	the	international	
bodies	are	pushing	the	PA	organizations	 into	cooperating	with	Israel:	 ‘they	[PA]	need	 funding	
from	the	EU	and	the	US,	but	the	US	and	the	EU	are	not	willing	to	fund	the	Palestinian	security	
forces	unless	the	Palestinian	security	forces	cooperate	with	Israel	to	maintain	Israel’s	security’	
(HR	NGO).	As	a	result,	the	PA	is	seen	as	a	continuation	of	the	occupation,	and	Israel	as	relieved	
from	 the	 human	 rights	 responsibilities	 of	 an	 occupying	 force.	 This	 view	 is	 expressed	 by	 the	
Restorative	 Justice	NGO:	 ‘Everyone	thinks	 the	Palestinian	Authority	 is	 just	doing	work	 for	 the	
Israelis.	So	why	do	they	want	to	trust	it.	It	is	but	from	the	occupation’	(Restorative	Justice	NGO).	
The	prisoner	NGO	similarly	references	a	continuation	of	history:		
	
In	the	early	80s,	the	Israelis	created	collaborators	to	represent	villages,	and	tried	
to	destroy	the	legitimacy	of	the	PLO.	These	people	used	to	have	guns	and	a	lot	of	
power,	and	use	violence,	beat	the	people,	shoot	them,	humiliate	them	...	The	idea	
behind	this,	this	idea	in	the	Israeli	mind	didn’t	disappear,	this	is	where	the	idea	of	
the	PA	came,	to	control	the	society	without	political	demands	and	give	security	for	
Israel,	and	this	is	basically	what	the	Palestinian	Authority	is	doing	today	(prisoner	
NGO).	
	
Some	NGOs	even	view	the	PA,	with	its	police	and	security	forces,	as	a	direct	threat.	The	human	
rights	NGO	believes	the	security	forces	regard	the	NGOs	as	enemies,	where	people	get	arrested	
for	 protesting,	 and	 incriminating	 rumors	 are	 spread	 by	 security	 forces.	 Tartir	 (2017:	 8)	 goes	
further,	arguing	that	‘the	overarching	goal	of	the	SSR	…	was	to	criminalize	resistance	against	the	
Israeli	occupation	and	to	silence	opposition	to	Israel’s	colonial	dominance’.	Some	NGOs	think	that	
the	international	bodies	put	pressure	on	the	PA	in	order	to	maintain	its	security	strength	so	it	can	
curb	and	control	the	Palestinian	population	to	prevent	disorder,	at	the	expense	of	legitimacy.	The	
human	rights	NGO	expresses	distrust:	‘There	is	pressure	from	the	Americans.	The	way	the	system	
works	is	that	the	Palestinian	Authority	needs	to	maintain	its	military,	or	its	security	strength,	so	
it	can	maintain	control	over	the	Palestinian	population’	(HR	NGO).	The	prisoner	NGO	tells	about	
experiences	 of	maltreatment	 and	 oppression	 of	 rights	 by	 the	 security	 forces.	 In	 their	 view,	 if	
human	rights	defenders	are	acting	against	PA	 interests,	 they	are	characterized	and	treated	as	
terrorists.	They	believe	the	security	forces	have	adopted	Israeli	military	strategies	and	behaviors.	
	
The	human	rights	NGO	is	of	the	opinion	that	nothing	has	really	changed	in	regard	to	the	JSS	since	
the	Oslo	Accords,	and	that	this	is	a	strategic	choice	from	international	bodies	and	aid	providers:		
	
A	 lot	 of	 the	 funding	 and	 aid	 that	 comes	 into	 Palestine	 doesn’t	 have	 the	 goal	 of	
achieving	change	for	the	better;	it	has	the	goal	of	sustaining	the	status	quo.	And	
that	 is	 two	 different	 things.	 So	 when	 the	 EU	 told	 the	 way	 they	 deal	 with	 the	
Palestinian	police	and	so	 forth	 it	 is	 simply	to	sustain	the	status	quo.	 It	 is	not	 to	
change	it	(HR	NGO).		
	
A	 question	 posed	 by	NGOs	 is	 to	whose	 security	 is	 the	 international	 effort	 aimed:	 Palestinian,	
Israeli,	regional	or	international	security?	
	
A	security‐focused	JSS	might	lead	to	a	militarization	of	social	control,	evident	in	Palestine	where	
close	to	half	the	male	population	has	experienced	imprisonment	in	Israeli	military	prisons.	This	
has	 such	 an	 impact	 on	 Palestinian	 society	 that	 the	 PA	 has	 established	 the	 Commission	 of	
Detainees	and	Ex‐Detainees	Affairs	(Aas	2012)	in	order	to	provide	assistance	to	the	imprisoned	
and	their	families.13	Following	a	Hobbesian	notion,	Palestinians	are	expected	to	surrender	their	
rights	to	use	violence	in	order	to	receive	peace,	order	and	state	protection	(cf.	Carrington	and	
Hogg	2017),	while	being	in	a	position	where	there	is	not	an	independent	state	able	to	offer	this.	
This	notion	of	 exchanges	 that	has	been	 central	 in	 criminology	and	 international	 relations	has	
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evolved,	however,	into	the	exchange	of	crime,	freedom,	democracy	and	equality	for	security;	law	
and	order	has	been	exchanged	for	security	(Bigo	2016).	This	Northern‐centered	idea	of	the	strong	
state	maintaining	 social	 order	 and	 security	 bypasses	 realities	 in	 the	 global	 South,	 such	 as	 in	
Palestine	where	social	order	and	conflict	resolution	has	been	in	the	hands	of	local	communities	
for	centuries,	and	the	security	offered	is	not	adapted	to	the	local	context	of	occupation,	of	a	state	
with	severely	limited	authority	and	legitimacy,	of	already	existing	mechanisms	of	social	control	
and	 conflict	 resolution,	 and	 where	 central	 questions	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 security	 and	
insecurity	remain	unaddressed.		
	
Concluding	notes		
In	restructuring	the	West	Bank	JSS,	Western	legal	knowledge	focusing	on	security	and	technical	
assistance,	where	Palestinians	are	to	learn	how	to	operate	a	rational	justice	system,	dominates	at	
the	 expense	 of	 political	 solutions	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 occupation	 and	 the	 PA.	 Local	 voices,	 here	
represented	 by	 local	NGOs,	 stress	 the	 crucial	 importance	 of	 fundamental	 changes	 in	 order	 to	
achieve	a	 functional	 JSS;	the	occupation	has	to	end	and	the	authorities	 in	Palestine	have	to	be	
legitimate	representatives	of	the	population.	Two	main	points	 in	this	article	are,	 first,	 that	the	
international	bodies	ignore	the	occupation,	although	centrally	important	to	the	Palestinians,	and,	
second,	that	the	international	bodies	ignore	the	extant	customary	justice	systems	important	to	
everyday	justice	for	Palestinians.	The	international	bodies	thus	ignore	both	central	knowledge	
and	needs	among	Palestinians	as	presented	by	the	local	NGOs.		
	
The	points	raised	both	confirm	earlier	studies	on	international	assistance	to	the	Palestinian	JSS	
and	 track	 postcolonial	 studies	 in	 several	 ways.	 In	 line	 with	 arguments	 from	 Southern	
Criminology,	the	assumption	behind	the	development	of	the	West	Bank	JSS	is	that	it	is	for	a	stable	
nation	state	system	with	a	high	degree	of	internal	peace,	ignoring	state	violence	(PA),	colonialism	
(Israel)	 and	 armed	 struggles	 (resistance	 against	 the	 occupation	 as	 crime	 or	 terrorism),	 and	
further	ignoring	customary	and	local	forms	of	law,	justice	and	conflict	resolution	(cf.	Carrington,	
Hogg	and	Sozzo	2016).	The	international	bodies’	subtext	involves	a	claim	to	universality,	where	
Northern	experience	and	expertise	within	the	field	become	universally	suitable	standards	as	part	
of	a	 linear	progression	toward	development.	The	international	bodies’	 focus	on	security	is	not	
experienced	by	the	NGOs	as	bringing	security	to	Palestinians,	and	the	forms	of	security	offered	
are	 not	 seen	 as	 legitimate.	 Not	 only	 do	 the	 international	 bodies	 offer	 money,	 providing	 an	
advantage	in	decision‐making	processes,	but	they	also	come	with	an	experienced	advantage	in	
knowledge	 about	 their	 own	 capabilities	 and	 those	 of	 the	 Palestinians.	 There	 are,	 however,	
differences	 between	 the	 two	 international	 bodies:	 the	 USSC	 is	 operating	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	
assumption	that	the	Palestinian	‘Other’	would	be	lawless	without	the	civilizing	influence	of	the	
international	bodies;	whereas	the	EUPOL	COPPS	sees	its	mission	as	merely	technocratic,	bringing	
knowledge	to	the	unknowledgeable,	denying	the	political	implications	of	their	work.		
	
Brynen	(2008:	241)	points	out	that	earlier	failures	of	peace‐	and	state‐building	in	Palestine	have	
not	been	due	 to	 inadequate	 technical	assistance	but	 rather	 to	 the	 failure	of	handling	 the	core	
problems	of	PA	and	Israeli	policies.	As	well‐intentioned	as	the	international	bodies	might	be,	they	
are	still	part	of	reproducing	an	image	of	the	Palestinian	‘Other’.	Palestinians	are	portrayed	as	the	
colonial	‘Other’	with	a	backward	legal	culture,	who	do	not	know	justice	besides	‘the	law	of	the	
gun’.	The	Palestinians,	meanwhile,	see	themselves	as	living	in	a	situation	where	the	law	of	the	gun	
in	the	occupation’s	hands	is	the	most	pressing	issue	of	everyday	life	and	the	development	of	a	
functioning	justice	and	security	sector.	
	
	
	
Correspondence:	Dr	Ida	Nafstad,	Senior	lecturer,	Department	of	Sociology	of	Law,	Lund	University,	
Allhelgona	Kyrkogata	14	M	Lund,	Sweden.	Email:	ida.nafstad@soclaw.lu.se	
	
Ida	Nafstad:	International	and	Local	Visions	of	the	Justice	and	Security	Sector	in	the	West	Bank	
IJCJ&SD						120	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2018	7(1)	
1	The	justice	and	security	sector	is	here	understood	as	the	Palestinian	Civil	Police,	the	National	Security	Forces	and	the	
judiciary.		
2	This	article	is	part	of	a	larger	project	focusing	on	the	Israeli	occupation’s	impact	on,	and	interaction	with,	the	rule	of	
law	and	plural	 legal	orders	in	the	West	Bank.	The	total	material	consists	of	34	interviews	with	about	50	persons,	
along	with	 three	months	 of	 court	 room	observations	 in	 the	West	Bank.	 Except	 for	 interviews	with	 international	
bodies	operating	in	the	West	Bank,	the	interviews	are	conducted	with	Palestinians	living	in	the	West	Bank	and	East	
Jerusalem,	 such	 as	 police	 officers,	 judges,	 prison	 workers,	 NGO	 staff,	 ex‐prisoners,	 social,	 youth,	 culture	 and	
community	workers,	mukhtars	and	lawyers.		
3	Milhem	and	Salem	(2011)	estimate	that	there	are	about	2,500	military	orders	in	the	West	Bank,	covering	most	fields	
of	law,	such	as	commercial,	judicial	and	criminal	law.	Enactment	of	new	orders	is	still	ongoing,	also	in	spheres	and	
responsibility	areas	of	the	Palestine	Authority.		
4	Palestinian	Presidential	decree	no.	1/1994	(Official	Gazette	of	the	Palestinian	National	Authority	1994)	states	that	
laws,	regulations	and	orders	in	force	before	5	June	1967	shall	continue	to	apply	until	unified	in	one	legal	framework	
(Khalidi	et	al.	2006).		
5	According	 to	 the	1954	 Jordanian	Law	to	Prohibit	Crimes	(Jordan	Official	Gazette	1954),	 local	governors	have	 the	
power	to	prevent	crime	by	measures	such	as	dispute	arbitration,	arrest	and	the	imposition	of	curfews	on	criminal	
suspects	(Kelly	2006).		
6	The	second	intifada	(Palestinian	uprising)	started	in	2,000,	sparked	by	Prime	Minister‐elect	Ariel	Sharon’s	intrusion	
at	 Jerusalem’s	 Temple	Mount	 together	with	 an	 armed	 entourage	 of	more	 than	 1,000	 Israeli	 police	 officers.	 The	
intifada	ended	in	2006	with	almost	6,000	Palestinians	and	around	1,000	Israelis	killed.	The	structural	backdrop	of	
the	second	intifada	was	the	failed	peace	talks,	continuing	occupation,	Palestinian	economic	crisis,	expanding	Israeli	
settlements,	severe	restrictions	of	movement	and	daily	humiliation	of	Palestinians	(Gordon	2008).		
7	The	text	of	the	agreement	in	the	Roadmap	for	Peace	is	available	at	
http://www.un.org/News/dh/mideast/roadmap122002.pdf	(accessed	21	January	2018).	
8	Even	though	this	is	an	old	account	of	the	SSR	situation	in	Palestine,	based	on	my	material	discussed	later,	it	is	still	
valid	to	a	large	degree.		
9	The	legal	basis	for	EUPOL	COPPS	is	the	Council	Joint	Action	2005/797/CFSP	of	14	November	2005	(Official	Journal	
of	the	European	Communities	2005).	
10	The	police	 advisory	 section	 comprises	 field	 advisors	 and	 specialist	 advisors.	 Field	 advisors	 visit	 police	 stations,	
conduct	surveys	on	capabilities	and	needs,	audit	Palestinian	Civil	Police	(PCP)	personnel,	facilities	and	equipment,	
deliver	basic	office	equipment	and	handcuffs	and	provide	training	on	their	use.	The	specialist	advisors	train	the	PCP	
in	 expertise	 areas	 such	 as	 criminal	 investigation,	 crime	 scene	management,	 public	 order,	 command	 and	 control,	
human	 resources	management,	 police	 administration,	 communication	 and	 training	 development	 (EUPOL	 COPPS	
n.d.).	
11	The	rule	of	law	section	addresses	the	prosecution	services,	courts,	High	Judicial	Council,	penitentiary,	Ministry	of	
Justice,	the	Bar	Association,	NGOs	and	the	law	faculties	(Bouris	2014).	The	aim	of	the	rule	of	law	section	is	to	‘support	
the	development	of	the	Civilian	Police	Law	and	guidelines,	the	prison	sector,	the	judicial	police,	and	work	related	to	
domestic	violence	and	honour	crimes	by	drawing	in	experts	from	new	areas,	including	prosecution,	defence	counsel,	
criminal	justice,	court	administration,	human	rights	and	policy	drafting’	(Bulut	2009:	292).		
12	The	last	election	was	in	2006,	and	it	was	Hamas	which	won	that	election,	not	Fatah,	the	party	now	ruling	the	West	
Bank.		
13	Until	2014,	the	commission	was	a	Ministry	under	the	Palestine	Authority	when	President	Mahmood	Abbas	issued	a	
presidential	decree	that	changed	the	Ministry	to	a	commission	to	be	placed	directly	under	the	Palestinian	Liberation	
Organization	(PLO)	(Toameh	2014).		
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